Abstract. To provide in-time reactions to a large volume of surveillance data, uncertainty-enabled event reasoning frameworks for closed-circuit television and sensor based intelligent surveillance system have been integrated to model and infer events of interest. However, most of the existing works do not consider decision making under uncertainty which is important for surveillance operators. In this paper, we extend an event reasoning framework for decision support, which enables our framework to predict, rank and alarm threats from multiple heterogeneous sources.
Introduction
In recent years, intelligent surveillance systems have received significant attentions for public safety due to the increasing threat of terrorist attack, anti-social and criminal behaviors in the present world. In order to analyze a large volume of surveillance data, in the literature, there are a couple of event modeling and reasoning systems. For example, Finite State Machines [5] , Bayesian Networks [3] , and Event composition with imperfect information [10, 11] , etc.
However, the decision support issue has not been properly addressed, especially on how to rank the potential threats of multiple suspects and then focus on some of the suspects for further appropriate actions (taking immediate actions or reenforced monitoring, etc.) based on imperfect and conflicting information from different sources. This problem is extremely important in the sense that in real-world situations, a security operator is likely to make decisions under a condition that the security resources are limited whilst several malicious behaviors happen simultaneously. Consider an airport scenario, a surveillance system detects that there is a very high chance that two young people are fighting in the shopping area, and at the same time, there are a medium chance that a person may leave a bomb in airport terminal 1. Now suppose there is only one security team available at that moment, which security problem should be first presented to the security team?
In order to address this problem, in this paper, we extend the event modeling framework [10, 11] with a decision support model for distributed intelligent surveillance systems, using a multi-criteria fusion architecture. More specifically, based on Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory [14] , we first improve the event modeling framework proposed in [10, 11] to handle the multi-criteria event modeling.
Then we use a normalized version of the Hurwicz's criterion [4] to obtain the degree of potential threat of each suspect (or suspects if they work as a team) with respect to each criterion. Finally, according to some background knowledge in surveillance, we apply a weighted aggregation operation to obtain the overall degree of potential threat for each suspect after considering all related criteria, from which we can set the priority for each subject.
This paper advances the state of the art on information analysis for intelligent surveillance systems in the following aspects. (i) We identify two factors that influence the potential threats in surveillance system: belief and utility. (ii) We propose an event modeling and reasoning framework to estimate the potential threats based on heterogeneous information from multiple sources. (iii) We introduce a weighted aggregation operator to combine the degrees of potential threats of each criterion and give an overall estimation to each subject.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps D-S theory and the event modeling framework in [10, 11] . Section 3 extends the event modeling framework in [10, 11] to handle the multi-criteria issue. Section 4 develops a decision support model with an aggregation operator to handle the problem of judging the degrees of potential threats for multiple suspects. Sections 5 provides a case study to illustrate the usefulness of our model. Finally, Section 6 discusses the related work and concludes the paper with future work.
Preliminaries
This section recaps some basic concepts in D-S theory [14] . 
In order to reflect the reliability of evidence, a Discount rate was introduced by which a mass function can be discounted [8] :
Definition 3. Let m be a mass function over frame Θ and τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) be a discount rate, then the discounted mass function m τ is defined as:
Finally, in order to reflect the belief distributions from preconditions to the conclusion in an inference rule, in [9] , a modeling and propagation approach was proposed based on the notion of evidential mapping Γ * . 
where
So a piece of evidence on Θ E can be propagated to Θ H through evidential mapping Γ * as follows:
Multiple Criteria Event Modeling Framework
In this section, we extend the event reasoning framework introduced in [10] to include multi-criteria, in order to allow for better decision making. We can associate an event with a mass value and a utility function for a given criterion. For example: e g,1 42 =(FCE, 9 : 01pm − 9 : 05pm, 42, 0.9, 0.6, gender, 0.2, 13, m g 42 ({male}) = 0.3, U g ) means that for an event type F CE at 9:01pm to 9:05pm, the gender classification program used by camera 42, whose degree of reliability is 0.9, detects that at Foreign Currency Exchange office (FCE), person with ID = 13 is recognized as male with a certainty of 30%. The significance of this event is 0.6, the weight of gender criterion for detecting a potential threat is 0.2, and U g is the utility function that shows the level of potential threat for the gender criterion. Related events are grouped together to form event clusters where events in the same cluster share the same event type, occT, Criterion, ID s , ID p , but may assign different mass values to subsets of the same frame. For example, two events for the person with ID 13 that are detected by camera 42 at 9:01pm to 9:05pm at FCE with the mass values m g 42 ({male}) = 0.3 and m g 42 ({f emale, male}) = 0.7 respectively are from the same cluster. Moreover, The mass items (i.e., the subsets and the mass values on the subsets) of all the events in an event cluster exactly form a mass function.
Compared with the model in [10] , we retain the components ET ype, sID and rb, whilst the differences are: (i) we represent events with a time duration, which is more realistic in real-life applications; (ii) we keep the person ID as a common attribute, since it is important for surveillance applications; (iii) the degree of significance in our definition indicates the relative importance of a given event based on the background information. For example, an event detected in an area with high crime statistics at midnight is more significant than that in an area of low-crime in the morning; (iv) in our model, an elementary event can only have one criterion attribute. For example, a man boards a bus at 8:00am is an elementary event, but a young man boards a bus at 8:00am is not an elementary event since both age (yonng) and gender (man) are criterion attributes. In fact, since a classification algorithm only focuses on one criterion attribute, this semantics of elementary is natural; (v) we introduce the attribute W eight to reflect the importance of a criterion when determining a potential threat. For example, age and gender usually are not the critical evidence to detect the potential threat, while behaviors, such as holding a knife, fighting, etc., are more important in determining the dangerous level of a subject; (iv) we introduce the Utility function to distinguish different levels of threats for the outcomes of each criterion. For example, the threat level of a young person should be higher than the threat level of an old person.
There might be a set of event clusters that have the same criterion and event type but with different source IDs or observation times. For example, a person broads a bus with its back facing camera 4 at 9:15pm and then sits down with its face partially detected by camera 6 at 9:20pm. Suppose the gender classification algorithm shows that m Since these two classification results (in two clusters) refer to the same criterion about the same subject from different sources, mass functions (after possible discounting) defined in the two clusters are combined using Dempster's rule. When an event is described with a duration, this event can be instantiated at any time point within this duration, That is, we can replace the duration with any time point within the duration. This is particularly useful when combining mass functions from different clusters, since events in these clusters may not share exactly the same time points or durations, but as long as their durations overlap, they can be combined. This is an improvement over [10] , which cannot handle such situation. Finally, a combined mass function must assign mass values to events in a derived event cluster. In this cluster, every derived event shares the same ET ype, sig, Criterion, W eight, ID p , location, U c as the original events, but occT , ID s , and rb are the union of those of the original events, respectively. Now, we consider event inference in our framework. Different from the rule definition in [10] , an inference rule in our framework is defined as a tuple (ET ype, Condition, m IET , U IET ), where: (i) m IET in our method is a mass function for possible intentions of a subject. It means the prediction of the subject's intention based on historic data or experts' judgement when the rule is triggered. For example, m IET for the event inference rule about loitering in a ticket counter is a mass function over a frame of discernment {Rob, W ait F or Some F riends}.
(ii) We only consider the behavior of the subjects to infer their intentions. Here, we divide behavior into different categories, such as movements (obtained by trajectory tracking), relations with objects, relations with peoples (obtained by the binary spatial relations of objects or people [12] ), hand actions to detect a fight (obtained by 2D locations of the hands), etc.
The reasons of these changes are: (i) It is not reasonable to ask experts to directly assign the degree of a potential threat without aggregating the factors that contribute to the threat, such as the significance of an event, the weight of different attributes, the outcomes of each criterion, etc.. Thus, defining m IET over the frame of discernment about possible intentions of a subject is more reasonable than the fixed frame of discernment: {T heart, N ot T heart}. (ii) It can reduce the amount of inference rules since we only consider the behaviors of the subjects to infer their intentions. (iii) It follows the well-known social psychology study result that humans can infer the intentions of others through observations of their behaviors [6] .
Finally, since events appeared in the condition of inference rules are themselves uncertain, we also apply the notion evidential mapping to obtain the mass functions of inferred events as [11] . Here is an example for the event inference rule in our model about the possible intentions of a subject in the shopping area. 
A Multi-criteria System for Threat Ranking
In this section, we will construct a decision support system that can automatically rank the potential threat degree of different subjects in a multiple criteria surveillance environment under uncertainty.
First, we calculate the degrees of potential threat for each criterion by extending the approach in [15] : For a subject with ID x w.r.t. a given criterion c specified by  mass function m c,x over Θ = {h 1 , . .
., h n }, where h i is a positive value indicating the utility (level of potential threat) of each possible outcome for criterion c, its expected utility interval (interval degree of potential threat) is EU I c (x) = [E c (x), E c (x)], where
Second, we apply the transformational form of the Hurwicz's criterion [4] , to find the point-valued degree of potential threat w.r.t. each criterion:
Definition 7. Let EU I c (x) = [E c (x), E c (x)] be an interval-valued expected level of potential threat of criterion c for subject with ID x, δ c (x) = sig be the degree of significance for the events, then the point-valued degree of potential threat for subject with ID x w.r.t. criterion c is given by:
Finally, we combine the potential threats w.r.t. each criterion by the following aggregation operator and then obtain the overall degree of potential threat of each subject.
Definition 8. Let C be the whole set of related criteria, nu c (x) be the pointvalued degree of potential threat for subject with ID x w.r.t. criterion c, w c be the weight of each criterion c, and k be the highest utility value for the outcomes of all criteria, then the overall degree of potential threat for subject x, denoted as O x , is given by
In fact, Equation (6) is a form of weighting average, where c⊆C w c nu c (x) is the overall value that considers the weighting effect of each criterion for the overall evaluation of potential threat, c⊆C (k+1)w c /2 is the averaging operator designed to avoid the situation that the more criteria the surveillance system detects, the higher value the potential threat is, and (k + 1)/2 can be consider as an intermediate value to distinguish low threat levels from high threat levels. Now, we reveal some properties of our model by the following Theorems:
be an interval-valued expected utility of criterion c for subject x, δ c (x) and δ c (x) be the degrees of significance for two different surveillance scenarios, and
Proof. By Equation (5), δ c (x) ≥ δ c (x) and E ≥ E, we have:
From Theorem 1 with δ c (x) representing significance, we can see that the point-valued degree of potential threats w.r.t. each criterion for the subjects would be higher if the set of events happen in an area with high crime statistics than that if the set of events happen in a lower crime area.
Theorem 2. Let EU I c (i) = [E c (i), E c (i)] be an interval-valued expected level of potential threat of the criterion c for subject with ID i (i ∈ {x, y}), and δ c (i) be the degrees of significance for the event of subject with ID i, then the point-valued degree of potential threat for these two subjects satisfies:
(
So, item (ii) holds.
In fact, Theorem 2 states two intuitions when considering the point-valued degree of potential threat of any two suspects: (i) for a given criterion, if the lowest expected level of potential threat for a suspect is higher than the highest expected level of potential threat of another suspect, the point-valued degree of potential threat of the first one should be higher; and (ii) if the degree of significance for the events of a suspect is not less than that of another, and the lowest and highest expected levels of potential threat of this suspect are higher than those of another respectively, the point-valued degree of potential threat of the first one should be higher.
Theorem 3.
Let O x and O y be the overall degrees of potential threat for subject x and y, C = C ∪ s and C = C ∪ r be the whole sets of related criteria for subjects x and y, k be the highest utility value for the outcomes of all criteria, and for any criterion c ∈ C, we have nu c (x) = nu c (y). Suppose ν s (x) > ν r (y) and
Proof. By Definition 8, nu c (x) = nu c (y), ν s (x) > ν r (y), and w s = w r we have:
Actually, Theorem 3 means that the increase of the point-valued degree of potential threat about a given criterion for a subject will cause the increase of the overall degree of potential threat for this subject, ceteris paribus. 
Case Study
Let us consider a scenario in an airport between at 9:00pm to 9:15pm, which covers the following two areas: Shopping Area (SA) and Control Center (CC).
-in the Shopping Area (SA), a person (id: 13) loiters near a Foreign Currency Exchange office (FCE) for a long time. Also, camera 42 catches its back image at the entrance of the shopping area at 9:01pm and camera 45 catches its side face image at FCE from 9:03pm to 9:15pm; -in the Control Center (CC), the face of a person (id: 19) appears in the camera 29 in the middle of the corridor (MoC) to the control center at 9:03pm. However, the person's face does not appear in camera 23 monitoring the entrance to the corridor. We assume that video classification algorithms can detect age, gender, behavior, and then re-acquire subjects (sr) when needed. We also assume that there is only one security team available. What should the system do at this moment?
First, the surveillance system detects the elementary events for each person as shown in Table 1 based on the information of multiple sensors.
For example, the first row in Table 1 means that for an event type SA in FCE at 9:01pm, the age classification program used by camera 42, whose degree of reliability is 0.9, detects a person with ID = 13 as male with a certainty of 30%. The significance of this event is 0.6, the weight of age criterion for detecting a potential threat is 0.3, and U a is the utility function that shows the level of potential threat for the age criterion. Moreover, some events in the Hence, in this example, we derive that id 19 is more dangerous than id 13. Thus, If we have only one security team available at that moment, the surveillance system will suggest to prevent the further action of the person (id: 19) in the control center first.
Related Work and Summary
Ahmed and Shirmohammadi in [1] designed a probabilistic decision support engine to prioritizes multiple events in different cameras. In this model, they incorporated the feedbacks of operators, event correlation and decision modulation to rank the importance of events. Jousselme et al. [7] presented the concept of a decision support tool together with the underlying multi-objective optimization algorithm for a ground air traffic control application. However, none of these models provides a method to handle multiple criteria information under uncertainty as our model does. Moreover, the problem of information fusion has become a key challenge in the realm of intelligent systems. A common method to handle this challenge is to introduce aggregation operators. Albusac et al. in [2] analyzed different aggregation operators and proposed a new aggregation method based on the Sugeno integral for multiple criteria in the domain of intelligent surveillance. Also, Rudas et al. in [13] offered a comprehensive study of information aggregation in intelligence systems from different application fields such as robotics, vision, knowledge based systems and data mining, etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research considering the decision making problem under uncertainty in surveillance systems.
In this paper, we introduced our extended event reasoning framework, integrating a multi-criteria decision making element in sensor network based surveillance systems. We also discussed some properties of our framework. Our next step of work is to experiment the decision making element with surveillance data.
